Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he past couple of decades have borne witness to a rapid increase in the number of lotteries whose proceeds go, in part, to the funding of public services. Some have suggested that the popularity of charitable lotteries has had a negative impact on the amount of money donated to charities. Borg, Mason and Shapiro (1991) in their study of the economics of state lotteries in the United States, observe that individuals who gamble seem to donate less money to charity than those who do not gamble. Similarly, Peacock (2000) observes that, with the growing popularity of the British National Lottery whose net proceeds go to charitable causes, the amount of direct donations to charities in the United Kingdom has fallen. What is the relationship between giving directly to charities and giving indirectly via charitable games? Aside from these two observations regarding the potential relationship between giving to charities directly and giving via lotteries, no paper has examined empirically the joint decision facing individuals regarding how much to donate to charities either directly or indirectly via a charitable lottery (or bingo and casino). In many ways, this gap is not surprising. The data requirements for treating these joint decisions are formidable. Indeed, it is the existence of a new and comprehensive data set in Canada, the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering, and Participating (NSGVP), that finally permits an empirical examination of the joint decisions of whether and how much to give directly and indirectly to charity.
Although a respectable body of literature now exists on the economics of gambling, 1 very few papers have addressed
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the particular issues associated with charitable gambling. Morgan (2000) was the first to model theoretically what happens when individuals can contribute to a public good via a lottery mechanism. He provides some justification for the use of lotteries by charitable agencies that do not have the ability to raise revenues through the tax system. Apinunmahakul and Barham (2002) show the conditions under which consumers will voluntarily contribute to charitable lotteries an amount equal to their Lindahl price.
In addition to looking at giving both directly and indirectly, this paper is one of only a handful of papers to address the determinants of charitable giving using Canadian data (Hood, Martin, and Osberg, 1977; Glenday, Gupta, and Pawlak, 1986; Kitchen, and Dalton, 1990; Kitchen, 1992; and Callen, 1994) . The list for the United States is rather long, and would include the first paper to tackle this subject from an econometric perspective (Taussig, 1967) , several empirical studies by Feldstein and coauthors (Feldstein, 1975a and 1975b; Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976; and Feldstein and Taylor, 1976) , as well as a host of other important contributions, including Clotfelter (1980 and 1985) , Brown (1987) , Barrett (1991) , Lankford and Wyckoff (1991) , Brown and Lankford (1992) , Greenwood (1993) , Randolph (1995) , Barrett, McGuirk and Steinberg (1997) , and Andreoni and Scholz (1998) .
Most of the literature on the economics of charitable giving use US data, and may be classified broadly into three groups. The principal objective of the first generation of papers was to address the question as to whether charitable donations should be tax exempt or not. To this end, many researchers set about the task of estimating how sensitive donors were to the 'price' (or tax-price) of giving-one minus the marginal tax rate whenever donations are tax exempt-as well as their income elasticity. This question is particularly important: if individuals are not very sensitive to the tax-price of donations, then the amount that they give to charitable organizations as a result of the tax exempt status of donations may not be sufficient to offset the attendant loss in government revenues. One of the striking features of this first generation of papers is that they typically found the tax-price elasticity to be greater than one (in absolute value terms) and the income elasticity to be less than one.
2 These two effects imply that charitable contributions are stimulated when they are exempt from taxes (e.g., Feldstein and Taylor (1976) , Clotfelter (1980 and 1985) ), hence justifying this policy for the United States.
In comparison to the earlier studies that essentially employed ordinary least squares techniques to tax-filer data, three innovations are worthy of note in what might be called the 'second generation' of research on this topic. First was the recognition of the need for improved econometric modeling, second, the use of better data (e.g., individual or household-level micro data, or panel data), and finally, the recognition that factors other than tax-price and income play a role in an individual's decision of how much money to donate to charities.
One might also identify a third generation of papers dealing with private charitable giving that would include those papers that do not focus particularly on price and income elasticities, but rather identify a broader group of other factors that are likely to influence an individual's charitable giving. In this last group one would place papers like Brown and Lankford (1992) and, more recently, Duncan (1999) , which examine the relationship between charitable giving and volunteering.
Our paper falls quite clearly into the third group of papers with its focus on a question hitherto ignored by the literature, namely on the relationship between direct giving and indirect giving via charitable games. Among other findings, the paper reveals that direct and indirect giving are complementary to each other: as cash donations increase so too do charitable gifts, a result which provides one explanation for the proliferation of charitable games experienced in recent decades. The paper also suggests a potential role to be played by government tax policy in influencing charitable gaming. Several key differences are revealed between religious and secular giving, with the former being much less responsive to government tax and expenditure policies in comparison to the latter. Finally, our results show that household income is not only an important determinant of direct contributions to charity, but of indirect donations as well.
We proceed as follows. The next section focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of the problem and the appropriate econometric models to employ. This is followed by a description of the data set, and then the analysis of the econometric results. The final section offers some conclusions and synthesizes the policy implications that flow from our analysis of direct and indirect gifts to charities.
ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework of this paper is rooted in the voluntary provision of public goods literature, as first developed by Bergstrom, Bloom and Varian (1986). 3 In the classical model of the voluntary provision of pure public good it is usually assumed that the public good (G) is provided by the total amount of voluntary contributions (Σ i g i ). In other words, the production of the public good is a function of all individuals' contributions: G = f(g i ), ∀i. For example, if the public good is provided by a constant-returns-to-scale (or linear) production technology, then, G = Σ i g i . In this study, however, we take account of the fact that charities actually raise their funds in two main ways: from direct gifts and from charitable games, including lotteries, bingos, casinos, as well as organized charitable concerts, galas, etc.
The two basic equations to be estimated are: 
Since the amount of giving either in cash or indirectly is greater than or equal to zero, we observe a censored dependent variable which cannot take on a negative value. The Tobit model is a good candidate for analyzing this problem. Since it is quite likely that individuals make the decision simultaneously as to whether and how much to give to charities directly and indirectly, the model should take this jointness into account. The bivariate Tobit model does precisely this, and hence is the basic framework used in this paper. Following Brown and Lankford (1992) and others, all continuous variables, including the dependent variables, are transformed using the natural logarithm.
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It is well known that the disturbance terms of the two censored regressions, ε d and ε d , are jointly normally distributed with 0 means, variances δ d and δ i , and the covariance δ di . If the correlation between the disturbances of the two equations, ρ di , is non-zero, a system of maximum likelihood functions is considered to be the efficient method of estimation. The maximum likelihood functions for the bivariate Tobit used in this study are similar to those presented in appendix A of Shonkwiler and Harris (1996) , as well as those described in the appendix of Brown and Lankford (1992) .
From the bivariate Tobit model in equations [1] and [2] , there are six interesting conditional means of giving that can be derived following the method in Pudney (1989, pp. 308-11) . 6 We use these conditional values, which are evaluated at sample means, to calculate the expected impact of a one percent change in selected (continuous) exogenous variables. The rate arising from this one percent change can be interpreted as the (conditional) elasticity of the giving. For example, the percentage change in E (Y d ,/ Y i ≥ 0), given that household income has increased by one percent, is an estimate of the income elasticity of giving in cash for households given that the household chooses to give indirectly as well. 7 The variables of this study for which these elasticities are 5 Following convention, a positive constant is added to the dependent variable in each model in order to deal with the fact that the dependent variable may take the value zero. We did a systematic search to determine the lowest value of this constant that would permit our models to converge. We chose 1,000 as the constant. The dependent variable is thus in (Y * + 1,000) for giving directly and indirectly. 6 The six conditional means are derived in Apinunmahakul (2001) Previous work on charitable giving suggests that religious givers are different than other givers (e.g., Feldstein (1975b) ). Thus we also separated our sample on the basis of whether the individual gave to a place of worship. For our place-of-worship sample (often referred to as the "religious" group) the dependent variable is the amount of money donated to the place of worship, whereas for the "non-religious" (or secular) group, the dependent variable is the amount of money going to places other than places of worship. Note that an individual may belong to both groups. One remarkable observation from Table 1 concerns the average amounts donated: twice as much money is donated, on average, to places of worship than to secular charities. Otherwise, compared to secular givers, religious givers tend to be a bit older, more often married, affiliated with a place of worship, and tend to have more children.
The NSGVP also provides information on a host of factors that may be considered 8 Because the estimation procedure employed is highly non-linear, it was crucial that the analysis be undertaken using a certain number of continuous variables which was impossible given the nature of the public-use NSGVP data set. As a result, our analysis had to be conducted using the non-public access master file of the NSGVP, which, among other things, contains information on the respondents' age and income. We are very grateful to Statistics Canada for giving us permission to use the master file of the NSGVP at their premises. Apinunmahakul and Devlin (2000) was written for Statistics Canada in return for access to this data set. 9 The NSGVP asked two questions regarding how much money an individual spent on charitable gaming: how much money is spent on charity-sponsored raffle or lottery tickets; and how much money is spent on charity-sponsored bingos or casinos. We define indirect giving as the sum of these two responses. We have no way of determining how accurate these responses are as they are based on individuals' recollections of their gaming activities in the past year. There is no other source of this type of information against which these responses could be judged. We are reasonably confident in the accuracy of the reported information given that individuals had the option of responding that they "did not know" and that Statistics Canada assures the anonymity of all respondents. 10 If we look at the number of people who play lotteries but do not give directly to charities, or of those who give both directly and indirectly to charities, we find that their distribution across provinces is very similar to the distribution of the whole sample, suggesting that access to charitable lotteries is similar across Canada.
as indicators of "social capital" or civic connectedness. The sample shows that 72 percent of cash givers have lived in their current residence for more than six years, while only 63 percent of the non-cash givers (i.e., indirect givers or non-givers) have dwelled in their residence for the same length of time. Furthermore, the majority of the sample participates in federal, provincial or municipal elections, but individuals who give both directly and indirectly are more active in elections (85 percent) than other people. Not surprisingly, some 80 percent of respondents were born in Canada, and about one half of the sample watches television 15-29 hours per week. In addition to the variables available in the NSGVP data set, we are also interested in how donors respond to the "price" of giving, which, assuming that donations are income-tax exempt, is reflected in the marginal tax rate facing the individual. In Canada, charitable contributions are treated as a tax credit rather than an income tax deduction which changes conceptually Before describing how the tax credit system works in Canada, we turn to a brief description of the Canadian income tax system. Income taxes are levied by the federal government and the provincial government. Federal taxes are levied as a function of income, essentially three tax brackets are in place. In 1997, all taxable income up to 29,590 dollars was taxed at 17 percent, taxable income between 29,590 and 59,180 dollars was taxed at 26 percent, and all taxable income above 59,180 was taxed at 29 percent. In all provinces except Quebec at that time, the provincial tax rate was determined as a percentage of the federal tax collected. Thus, for instance, in 1997 Ontario imposed an income tax that was 48 percent of the federal tax bill for each resident. Quebec, by contrast, administered (and continues to administer) its own income tax system that was independent of the federal system. Because all individuals must pay federal taxes, variations in provincial tax rates constitute the primary source of variation in income taxes for a given individual with a given income living in Canada.
The tax-credit system in Canada for donations is largely prescribed by the federal government and is as follows: the first 200 dollars of donations are awarded a tax credit of 17 percent, while all amounts exceeding 200 dollars earn a credit of 29 percent. However, since provincial taxes are usually a percentage of the federal tax payable, the tax credit awarded any given individual is significantly greater than the amounts just indicated. As a consequence, every individual who gives less than 200 dollars residing in prov- dollars receive a higher income tax credit than those who give less. However, this also implies that the tax-price of the donation is not independent of the amount the individual gives. To avoid this endogeneity problem, we use the tax rate applicable on the first 200 dollars of donations. In Quebec, all individuals are given a 23 percent tax credit on donations, irrespective of how much they give. When the federal tax credit is taken into account, the tax savings from a 100 dollar donation in Quebec is 40 dollars-the lowest tax-price of all Canadian provinces.
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The analysis also looks at how individual giving may be affected by government spending. In this study, we include as a measure of government spending per capita consolidated provincial-local government expenditures on programs. Although we would have liked to analyze the impact of different areas of provincial government spending, such as health care, education, and social services on giving, this proved to be impossible because such expenditures were highly collinear with each other, rendering the bivariate Tobit model unable to converge. We, thus, had to confine our analysis to using the total per capita amount of provincial government program expenditures.
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A FEW ECONOMETRIC COMMENTS
At the onset, it is important to establish that the bivariate Tobit model is indeed the best approach for the problem at hand, which requires determining if the decisions of whether and how much to give to charities directly and indirectly should be estimated jointly using the bivariate Tobit or separately using two different Tobit specifications. To answer this question, we turn to Tables 2 through  4 which report the bivariate Tobit and bivariate probit estimates for the full sample (Table 2) , for donations to places of worship-the "religious" sample (Table  3 )-, and for donations to organizations other than places of worship (Table 4) . 13 At the end of these tables are the estimates of the standard error of each regression, as well as the estimates of the correlation between these standard errors (ρ). Notice that, in all cases, the estimated rhos are highly statistically significant, indicating that giving directly and indirectly are jointly determined and hence should be estimated using a procedure that takes this into account.
14 Furthermore, the sign of the estimated rhos is positive, meaning that, holding everything else constant, people who donate directly to charities are more likely to engage in charitable gaming.
Before turning to the results, two econometric issues need to be addressed. The first concerns heteroscedasticity: the assumption that the variance of the disturbance term is constant across the sample typically does not hold for cross-sectional data (e.g., Greene (1997) , chapter 12). However, in our case, a series of Lagrange-Multiplier tests run on different groups of variables indicated that heteroscedasticity was not present, at least for several groups of variables under study. 15 Another potential econometric problem arises because our tax-price and government expenditure variables are the same for all individuals living in a given province.
16 When using otherwise individually-based data, if the random disturbances within groups (in this case provinces) are correlated across each other (perhaps due to an unobserved characteristic shared across members of this group), then including group-invariant variables, like tax-price and government expenditures, may bias downward the standard errors arising from an ordinary least squares regression (Moulton, 1990) . 17 While we are concerned about this possibility, the fact that our model is highly 12 The government spending data were obtained from CANSIM matrices 8181-8193. The spending variables exclude expenditures on debt charges and transfers to local governments. Population data came from CANSIM matrices 6367-6378 and 6408-6409. 13 Notice that the fact that we are referring to donations to places of worship as the "religious" group should be interpreted rather narrowly. First, in no way do we think that, by not giving to a place of worship, a person is not religious. Second, people may give to religious organizations that are not places of worship. We thus refer to donations to organizations other than places of worship as being "non-religious" or secular, only to ease the exposition. 14 In all cases, likelihood ratio tests confirm that the estimated coefficients when the sample is disaggregated are statistically different from those which arise in the full sample. 15 For instance, we ran a series of LM tests for four groups of variables for the bivariate probit model: education (four variables: LM = 3352.718), government expenditure and regional dummies (five variables: LM = 3381.652), presence and number of children (four variables: LM = 3355.883), and the length of time in the current residence plus whether or not the individual was born in Canada (three variables: LM = 3330.475). All LM statistics far exceed any critical value of chi-squared statistics, accepting the hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 16 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this weakness. 17 Although we do not employ an OLS procedure, there is every reason to believe that the standard errors in our more complicated model would be biased as well. non-linear means that no obvious correction is possible. Moreover, because we have an extensive data set which permits the inclusion of variables often unavailable in studies of this type, the probability of having within-group disturbance correlations is reduced.
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A final point to note concerns statistical significance and elasticities. If an estimated coefficient is statistically significant, one tends to think of the variable to which the coefficient belongs as being "important" in terms of explaining the variation in the dependent variable. However, it is not at all clear what "important" means: a variable may be highly statistically significant, but its impact on the dependent variable is minute. To this end, a measure of the marginal impact of the variable or the elasticity of the variable would be very useful. This is relatively easy to compute for the bivariate probit model 19 but is much more complicated to obtain for the bivariate Tobit model. As described earlier, in order to get an idea of the impact of changing one of the independent variables on the amount donated, we estimate the conditional expected value of giving (either directly or indirectly) evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables, and then compare what will happen if one of these independent variables increases by one percent.
RESULTS
In contrast to much of the previous work on charitable giving, this study makes use of a whole host of personal and household characteristics that are likely to influence an individual's decision to give to charity-characteristics that were simply not available to many of the other researchers. 20 Our discussion focuses mainly on the Tobit and probit results presented in Table 2 18 Furthermore, because we had access to a broad array of independent variables, the likelihood of an omitted variable bias is diminished. We thank an anonymous referee for this observation. 19 In the probit model, the partial derivative indicates the change in the probability of an individual donating money given a very small change in the given variable, ceteris paribus. 20 Personal characteristics are more commonly available only for micro-data studies. Since most of the other studies use aggregate data, then their exclusion is understandable. For those papers that used survey data, several reasons may explain why some personal or household characteristics have been ignored. For instance, Kitchen and Dalton (1990) who use the 1982 Survey of Family Expenditure data set in Canada, report that they could not use certain variables because of a collinearity problem (p. 291). Other papers may well have been simply following the pattern set by the earlier generation of work on this subject. sample of 15,422 observations. However, we also decompose this sample into two sub-samples-gifts to places of worship ("religious" gifts) and other (secular) gifts-a distinction that clearly matters when it comes to understanding the impact of tax-price and government expenditures on donations to charity. Thus, while our focus is on the results in Table  2 , we refer to the results in Tables 3 and 4 whenever necessary. The first result worthy of note is that donations to secular charities appear to be more responsive to changes in the tax-price of donations in comparison to donations to places of worship. Government tax policy thus has a more important role to play in influencing secular gifts than religious ones. We can uncover this result by comparing the estimated coefficient on the tax-price for the bivariate Tobit specifications over Tables 2, 3 and  4. 21 Looking at the full sample (Table 2) , we see that the estimated coefficient on the tax-price of giving is statistically insignificant. But, examining this variable across the religious and secular groups reveals a different story. Donations to charities other than places of worship are strongly influenced by the tax-price of donations (Table 4) , whereas religious giving is not. The finding that "religious" givers are less sensitive to the price of donations in comparison to "non-religious" givers is consistent with the results of earlier studies that were able to separate donors into these two broad categories (e.g., Feldstein (1975b) and Kitchen (1992) ). The probit estimates corroborate this result. The tax-price of giving exerts a negative and statistically significant influence on the decision to give for the full sample and the secular sample. A 0.01 increase in this tax price (from 0.705 to 0.715) would reduce the average individual's probability of giving by 0.03. However, the probability of giving by the religious group is invariant to tax price. 21 We are using before-tax income in this study which could bias downwards the estimated coefficient on tax-price because it ignores the fact that a high price means low taxes and thus higher disposable income. However, there are a few reasons why the problems associated with using pre-tax income with Canadian data may not be as acute as they are in the US case. First, our tax-price varies less than in the US because the Canadian system is based on a tax-credit for donations which is very flat. The federal portion of the tax-credit is flat across the board for the first 200 dollars donated, and hence the only variation in the credit is inter-provincial. Second, while the income effect arising from the tax savings could bias downward the coefficient on tax-price, there is reason to believe that this additional income effect is quite small because the income elasticity of donations is less than one. Moreover, the average tax savings from average donations are also quite small-in the range of 51 dollars for a 200 dollar donation-and these constitute a very small portion of income. To get a sense of how important the tax-price is to secular givers, we can examine how the expected value of direct giving changes with a one percent increase in tax-price.
22 From Table 5C we see that this change in the expected value of direct giving, conditional on having given indirectly, is -1.4 percent, and conditional on giving both directly and indirectly, is -2.3 percent. These estimated elasticities compare well to those found elsewhere in the literature, although it is difficult to compare our study directly with others because only a couple of papers have relied on the bivariate Tobit procedure to estimate giving (Brown and Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999) , and these papers were looking at the giving in cash and volunteering decisions, not the giving directly and indirectly problem that is the subject of the present study. Brown and Lankford (1992) calculate their price elasticity of giving using the estimated coefficient from the bivariate Tobit model -i.e., they calculated uncensored elasticities, not the censored elasticities which we calculate in our study-and find a price elasticity of demand of -1.79 for men and -1.62 for women. Duncan (1999) finds a price elasticity of -2.21. Our results from the bivariate Tobit model indicate that individuals are a bit less sensitive to changes in the tax-price of giving in comparison to these US studies.
The fact that the estimated coefficient of tax-price in the indirect giving equation is negative and statistically significant reveals that individuals consider giving directly to charities and playing charitable games as complementary activities. 23 It also implies that government tax policy can influence charitable gaming. 22 As indicated earlier, estimates of price elasticity arising from a cross-sectional data set may be biased because they mix up transitory and permanent price changes (see Randolph (1995) ). However, because the tax-price used here varies only according to province of residence (and not according to income or amount of money donated), our estimates of tax-price elasticity should not be subject to this sort of bias. Once again, we thank an astute referee for this comment. 23 There is no tax credit (or deduction) associated with charitable gaming. In principle, the price of giving indirectly (lotteries, bingos, etc.) should be included in the direct giving equation as well. Unfortunately, we were unable to find any meaningful data in this regard. For instance, there is no information on the "typical" price of a lottery; the price of bingo is certainly not standardized, not to mention the problems associated with determining a price for charitable gambling. We did try including provincial consumer price indices as a crude measure of the cost of gambling by province, but they were simply too correlated with our tax variable to be of any use. table gaming conditional on having also contributed directly and a 2.4 percent decrease in this expected value given that the individual contributed both directly and indirectly. The probit results corroborate this finding: the probability of engaging in a charitable lottery falls with an increase in the tax-price of donations. For example, from Table 2 we see that a one percent increase in the average tax price leads to a .0648 decline in the probability of playing a charitable game. The result that giving directly and indirectly are complementary to each other provides one explanation for the increasing number of charitable games introduced over the past couple of decades.
Charities can increase their revenues by providing an indirect avenue through which individuals may give. From a public policy perspective it also means that the impact of tax policy on charities may be even greater than originally considered because of its additional influence on charitable gaming.
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Another way that government policy has the potential to influence private philanthropy is through expenditure decisions. Our paper suggests that direct donations to secular charities may be crowded out by government expenditures whereas religious donations are not. While the NSGVP data set is not perfect for examining this problem, the only vari-ation in expenditure is inter-provincial; it allows us to explore at a rudimentary level the relationship between provincial spending and charitable giving. Our measure of government expenditure includes consolidated provincial and municipal expenditures, excluding transfer payments and debt servicing, on a per-capita basis. From Table 2 , we find that government expenditure does not statistically affect the amount donated directly to charity. However, this result appears to be driven largely by the unresponsiveness of the religious group. For the secular group, government expenditures have a negative, albeit weakly significant, impact on donations. From Table 5C , we see that the magnitude of the effect of this variable is quite large:
25 a one percent increase in average per capita government expenditure leads to a 2.4 percent decrease in direct giving by the non-religious group, conditional on having given also indirectly, and a 4.2 percent decrease in direct giving, conditional on having given both directly and indirectly. These results point to a crowding-out effect between private secular giving and government spending.
The probit analysis also points to significant differences between religious and secular givers: for the former, an increase in government expenditures appears to promote the decision to give more to charities, whilst it reduces the probability of giving by the latter. Part of the reason why government expenditures have differing effects across the two groups may lie in the fact that places of worship receive relatively little financial assistance from governments whereas secular charities frequently receive significant government funding for their day to day operations (see, Day and Devlin (1997) ). Perhaps individuals, upon observing government growth in other sectors, are inclined to give to places of worship knowing that these places are less supported by government funding.
Another interesting finding is that government expenditures appear to crowd out charitable gaming. As per-capita government expenditures increase, charitable gaming falls. For instance, Table 5A reveals that a one percent increase in government expenditures leads to a 2.1 percent decrease in indirect giving, given that the individual also gives directly, and a 3.8 percent decrease in indirect giving, given that the individual gives directly and indirectly. The religious and secular groups behave similarly. We also find that per capita expenditures exert a negative impact on the probability that the individual participates in charitable gaming: from Table 2 we see that a 0.01 increase in per capita expenditures would decrease the probability of engaging in a charitable game by 0.005.
Notwithstanding the limitations of our analysis, it certainly appears as though crowding out is a potential concern when it comes to government expenditures and charitable contributions, a result which compares well to other empirical papers on this topic (e.g., Abrams and Schmitz (1984) , and Kingma (1989) ). There are at least two avenues through which individuals may realize that government expenditures have changed. Charities typically derive a portion of their revenue from government grants, indeed, data from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (formally Revenue Canada) T3010 charitable returns for several years indicate that virtually every type of charitable organization receives some form of government grant, although some types of organizations rely much more heavily on these funds than do others (Day, and Devlin 1997). As government expenditures fall, grants too may fall, leading to a shortfall in services which is picked up by private contributions. Furthermore, as government expenditures fall, the general level of public services fall which again can lead to an increase in private contributions to offset this decline in public services. The fact that government expenditures and private contributions are apparently substitutes for each other bodes well for charities grappling with government cutbacks. However it also implies that charities may not benefit fully from additional government largesse.
Aside from tax-price and government expenditures, a third variable to have received a great deal of attention in the literature on charitable giving is income. There is no doubt that income plays an important role in charitable giving-just how important has been the subject of extensive debate in the literature. 26 Most of the first generation of studies found an income elasticity of less than onetypically around 0.8, but as low as 0.2 27 -indicating that as individuals' income increased, charitable contributions would increase but by proportionately less than the rise in income. The basic result that charitable contributions are a normal good with an income elasticity of less than one essentially holds for the next generation of papers as well, but with perhaps a larger variance across the different studies. Our findings corroborate this basic result. Table 2 reveals that income is highly statistically significant in our model, for both the direct and indirect giving equations. To see how important income is, we can look at its marginal impact in the bivariate probit model reported in this table. For the full sample, a 10 percent increase in income would increase the probability of giving directly to charity by 0.004: for the religious group, this increase is 0.003, while for the secular group, a 10 percent increase in average income would have double the impact on giving, i.e., a 0.006 increase in the probability of giving.
Turning once again to our estimated elasticities from the bivariate Tobit model (Table 5) , we find that a one percent increase in household income generates a 0.8 percent increase in the expected value of direct giving, conditional on indirect giving being present, or a 1.2 percent increase in the expected value of direct giving, conditional on both direct and indirect giving being positive. A one percent increase in household income increases indirect giving by 0.2 percent (or 0.4 percent). At this juncture, it is also worthwhile noting that calculating the elasticity of income using the estimates from the bivariate Tobit model provides elasticity measures which are larger than those arising from the univariate Tobit model with separate equations for direct and indirect giving. In the univariate Tobit model, a one percent increase in household income will increase the expected value of direct giving, conditional on giving being positive, by 0.5 percent. The comparable figure for indirect giving is 0.3 percent. 28 Clearly estimating the two 26 Randolph (1995) discusses the important distinction between transitory and permanent income (and price) effects, and points out that estimates of these effects from cross-sectional studies are biased in the sense that they will be picking up elements of both effects. Our income-elasticity estimates will suffer from this bias. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this deficiency. 27 See Clotfelter (1985) for a review of the earlier studies. 28 For the sake of brevity, the univariate results are not provided. In the bivariate Tobit model, the total effect on direct giving of a one percent change in an exogenous variable is the sum of the impact of the exogenous variable on unconditional direct giving plus the effect on direct giving arising from the fact that the exogenous variable also affects indirect giving. That the bivariate Tobit income elasticity estimate is larger than the univariate Tobit estimate suggests that giving indirectly has a positive impact on giving directly, and giving directly has a positive impact on giving indirectly, thus supporting the idea that direct and indirect gifts are complementary to each other.
equations jointly is important when it comes to calculating the impact of income on donations. The finding that the income elasticity of donations is (usually) less than one coupled with our result that religious donations are insensitive to tax-price leads to another policy implication. From the point of view of government finances, the "cost" of giving a tax credit (or tax deduction) to places of worship in terms of forgone taxes may not be offset by increased contributions to these organizations either from the tax-price effect or from the effect of having more income in the hands of potential donors. We hesitate to push this policy implication too strongly given that our results are based on a cross-sectional analysis. However, it does suggest that further work, which pays close attention to the different influences on secular and religious donations, could be fruitfully undertaken.
Finally, several other characteristics affect direct and indirect donations to charity. Some differences in donating behaviour can be seen across men and women, and married and single individuals. Age plays a statistically significant and important role in explaining direct giving, but has a far less pronounced effect on charitable gaming. 29 Children appear to have a large positive influence on the amount donated directly to places of worship, more so than to secular charities. For charitable games, children never have a negative effect, and the presence of children aged 6 to 12 typically increases the likelihood that someone would engage in a charitable game. Overall, the age of children matters in terms of the probability of giving and the amount given both directly and indirectly, meaning, of course, that the giving pattern of the household is likely to change over time as children become older.
In keeping with the results in the literature (e.g., Brown, and Lankford (1992) , Duncan (1999)), we find that the decision to give and the amount to give directly to charities are positively related to an individual's level of education: the more educated a person is, the more likely it is that he or she will decide to give directly to charity, and the more money he or she will give. Among other things, this finding implies that education yields yet another positive externality, providing further support for the continued public funding of education. Education also has a positive impact on charitable gaming: those with a university education play charitable lotteries more than any other group.
From Table 2 , we see that being affiliated with a place of worship (religious) exerts a positive impact on giving directly and indirectly. In addition to corroborating the finding that religious people give relatively more to religious and secular charities (e.g., Feldstein (1975b) , Kitchen (1992) ), our paper also demonstrates that religious people are more likely to play charitable games.
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Several variables were included in the regression analyses that try to capture how connected an individual feels to the community. The length of time that the individual has resided in his or her cur-29 Note that in cross-sectional studies, one cannot distinguish between age effect and cohort effect. Thus, for instance, we cannot indicate with certainty if giving increases with age per se, or if older people now happen to belong to a more generous cohort. Rather than using the natural logarithm of age as our dependent variable, we also ran the regressions with age categories following that of Brown and Lankford (1992) ; using age categories does not affect our results except that the estimated coefficient on tax-price becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the full sample. We chose to use the continuous age variable rather than age categories for two reasons: first, it seemed natural to use the actual age of the individual given that this information was available to us; and second, we have a large number of dichotomous variables in our model already-using age groups increases this number and hence renders convergence of the model more difficult. 30 Note that our religious variable had to be excluded from the probit equations for the disaggregated samples in order for the regressions to converge. rent abode has a clear positive impact on direct and indirect contributions. Generally speaking, people who live in a rural community (less than 15,000) contribute more than those who live in a town (15,000 to 100,000) who are, in turn, more generous than those who live in a city. 31 People born in Canada (canadian) donate more, on average, to charities than do others, likely capturing the fact that new immigrants are less aware of the channels for formal charitable giving. The results from the bivariate Tobit model point to a clearly negative relationship between direct giving and television viewing, supporting the views of Putnam (2000) and Glaeser (2000) who argue that social capital diminishes with the amount of television viewed. Finally, our results suggest that people who vote are more generous in their gifts to charity in comparison to their non-voting counterparts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Several findings with policy relevance are revealed by our analysis: government tax policy has a differential impact on religious and secular donations; religious and secular gifts respond differently to changes in government expenditures; direct and indirect donations are complementary to each other; and direct and indirect donations respond differently to government policy variables.
From the point of view of understanding the determinants of charitable contributions, our analysis benefited from the fact that donations to places of worship could be separated from secular donations. We find that secular gifts are more sensitive to changes in the tax-price of donations in comparison to religious ones. Similarly, only contributions to secular charities are crowded-out by government expenditures, while religious donations are not. These findings suggest that government fiscal policy can not only affect the amount of money donated to secular charities, but that fiscal policies themselves have the potential to affect the mix of charitable donations between secular and religious organizations. Our results also suggest that further work could be fruitfully undertaken to examine whether or not all charitable contributions should be given tax-exempt status.
Our analysis is much richer than one which focuses solely on direct contributions. Until now, no one has examined empirically the relationship between giving to charities directly via tax-exempt donations and indirectly via an array of charitable games. The fact that individuals can contribute to charities (and thus the public good) in these two ways suggests that these two methods of giving may well be related in some way. Indeed, the literature has alluded to a link between giving directly and indirectly but has not been able to examine this link in a systematic manner, until now. It is the availability of a new and rich data set that allows us to determine the relationship between giving directly and indirectly to charity.
We find that the decisions of whether and how much to give to charities directly and/or indirectly are undertaken jointly by individuals. Moreover, individuals consider these methods of giving to charity as complementary to each other. One reason for this complementarity may be that once an individual is sold on the idea of buying a lottery ticket for (or giving directly to) charity, it may be easier to sell him or her on the idea of making a charitable contribution (or buying a charitable lottery ticket) as well ( e.g., Charity Village (1997)). The finding that giving directly and indirectly are complementary to each other flows from the observation that charitable gaming appears to be sensitive to the tax-price of donations. While more work needs to be done on this question, this finding implies that tax policy could be considered as an instrument not only to affect charitable contributions but also to influence charitable gaming. It also means that the overall impact of tax policy on donations to charity may be larger than was previously found. An increase in the marginal tax rate may lead to both an increase in direct gifts to charity and an increase in indirect gifts to charity via charitable gaming.
Of course, the question that we cannot answer here is whether or not the charities themselves will end up with more net revenue as a result of indirect gifts. Although very little data are available over time on the amount of revenue going to charities as a result of charitable gaming, the available evidence is certainly encouraging from the point of view of charities. For instance, the province of Alberta has seen an almost three-fold increase in the returns to charities from holding casinos over the past three years: from 27.8 million dollars in 1996-97 to 76.7 million dollars in (Alberta Gaming Corporation, 2000 . And, in spite of an increase in the number of charitable lotteries, total donations have generally been on the rise in real terms over the period from 1984-96 (Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, 1997) .
From the point of view of charities, there is cause for some optimism on the revenue front. If donating directly and indirectly are complementary activities, individuals will not be substituting charitable gambling activities for the more traditional direct donations. Indeed, the introduction of charitable games may well lead to more money for the charity's coffers. Of course, the cost of running these indirect mechanisms is high, and the chance of individuals contracting "lottery fatigue" must certainly be taken into account for the long-run success of this form of fund-raising. The facts that the income-elasticity of charitable giving is low, and that government funding crowds-out private contributions, combine to suggest that the charities' revenues are likely to be quite stable over time, in spite of business cycle fluctuations and government restraints and surpluses.
There remains work to be done in this area. Our understanding would be greatly enhanced by a theoretical model that examines direct and indirect gifts to charities. On the empirical front, more and better longitudinal data would permit us to conduct a richer analysis of the impact of tax policy and government spending on direct and indirect donations. It would also enable us to examine the extent to which the revenues of charities are affected by the introduction of charitable games.
